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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses the content, origin and development of 
Tendering Theory as a theory of price determination. It 
demonstrates how tendering theory determines market prices and 
how it is different from game and decision theories, and that in 
the tendering process, with non-cooperative, simultaneous, 
single sealed bids with individual private valuations, extensive 
public information, a large number of bidders and a long 
sequence of tendering occasions, there develops a competitive 
equilibrium. 
 
The development of a competitive equilibrium means that the 
concept of the tender as the sum of a valuation and a strategy, 
which is at the core of tendering theory, cannot be supported 
and that there are serious empirical, theoretical and 
methodological inconsistencies in the theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1956, ostensibly in the spirit of game theory, a paper by 
Lawrence Friedman and titled A Competitive-Bidding Strategy 
appeared in the journal Operations Research. The real importance 
of the paper was not so much in what it said, but in the way it 
generated interest, research, theorising and publications to the 
extent that we can now identify tendering as one of the best 
documented and well researched areas of building economics, 
although the development of a consistent theoretical framework 
has been slower and very little of the writings has been devoted 
to testing, verifying or analysing the theory itself. 
 
Friedman's paper (1956, 1957) had a simple and clear message: to 
maximise the expected profit from a single tender where each 
competitor simultaneously submits one closed bid (tender). The 
bidder (tenderer) should select the mark-up on cost that 
maximises expected value of the profit which is the product of 
the mark-up and the probability of winning the contract.  
 
As Friedman (1956, 1957) pointed out, the problem lies in 
determining the probability of winning as a function of the 
mark-up. His solution was to study previous encounters with the 
competitors to establish their "bidding patterns". More 
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specifically, this is done by calculating the ratios between the 
competitors’ tenders and the decision-maker's own cost estimate. 
Provided there have been a sufficient number of previous 
encounters, it is then possible from this pattern, to estimate 
the probabilities of winning with different mark-ups against 
each competitor and through aggregation, against each possible 
combination of competitors. 
 
The rest of the paper is devoted to alternative objectives, 
estimating the probability distribution of number of 
competitors, the likely shapes of the probability density 
functions of the competitors’ bids and the strategy when several 
bids are submitted simultaneously and there are restrictions on 
the total value of all bids. The paper is clear, every 
assumption is clearly stated, it is simple and deals with a 
simple issue: how to approach a single bid (or set of 
simultaneous single bids). 
 
The next major paper on the topic was Gates' (1967) Bidding 
Strategies and Probabilities.  This paper reinterpreted 
Friedman's strategy for a single bid into a general, profit 
maximising pricing model for tendering.  While Gates gives no 
acknowledgment to Friedman's paper in the development of his own 
model1, there are many similarities between the two papers. Like 
Friedman, Gates asserted that the probability of winning a bid 
could be estimated from previous encounters and that the 
appropriate strategy was to maximise the expected value of the 
profit of the bid. However, what for Friedman was the 
appropriate strategy for a single bid, Gates turns into a 
general strategy, with general applicability. In effect, Gates 
has taken a simple decision support model and reformulated it 
into an economic model for price determination of construction 
projects. 
 
There were additional differences, including a difference in how 
the probability of winning over more than one competitor was 
estimated. In the literature, the attention has concentrated on 
this single aspect of the two papers and there has been a number 
of empirical and theoretical tests of the comparative 
appropriateness of the proposed methods of aggregation of 
probability (e.g. Rosenshine, 1972, Dixie, 1974, Fuerst, 1975, 
1976, 1977, 1979, Gates, 1970, 1976b, 1979, Benjamin and Meador, 
1979, Carr, 1982, 1987a), the correct analysis being applied by 
Weverberg (1978). The important implications of the 
transformation from a strategy for a single event in Friedman's 
paper to a general theory of price determination of construction 
projects in Gates' paper has, however, been completely ignored 
to date. 
 
                                                          
1 There is one oblique reference to the book in which the 1957 version of Friedman’s paper appeared, 
where Gates remarks that “other investigators [sic] consider the problem of winning over several 
competitors as one of independent events” (p 102). 
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TENDERING THEORY AS A THEORY OF PRICE DETERMINATION 
 
Before progressing any further, it may be worthwhile to 
summarise the essential characteristics of tendering theory. As 
expressed by Gates - and also as explicitly stated by Friedman - 
tendering theory is a theory of pricing. As a theory of pricing, 
the optimum bid has two components: the estimated cost of 
executing the project, including the return to capital, and a 
strategy for maximising profit, which, with some qualifications 
discussed below, is effectively a constant mark-up. 
 
As suggested by Archibald (1959), the assumptions of economic 
theories can be divided into (i) statements about motivation; 
(ii) statements about the behaviour of the economic agents; 
(iii) statements about the existence and stability of functional 
relationships; (iv) restrictions on the range of variables to be 
taken into consideration and (v) boundary conditions under which 
the theory is held to apply. These assumptions are summarised in 
Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Summary of assumptions for tendering theory. The 
assumptions of economic theories may be divided into 
Motivational Assumptions, Behavioural Assumptions, Assumptions 
about Functional Relationships, Assumptions about Restrictions 
on the Range of Variables and Assumptions of Boundary Conditions 
or Applicability. 
 
This stresses a concept of tendering that departs from the 
traditional way of looking at the tendering process: it goes 
beyond the winning tender as determining the price of an 
individual contract into a theory of pricing in an industry 
where each object is unique. 
 
To justify the concept of an economic price theory, we need to 
establish that there is a market and a single product for sale 
in that market. Here we have a conceptual problem in the 
traditional way of looking at the output of the building 
industry. Certainly, if we look at each project as a design, a 
location, a time and a set of building materials, each project 
is unique. However, we must look away from the obvious 
differences in different buildings and realise that these 
buildings are not what the builders are selling. Builders are 
selling the skills to assemble buildings, the management skills 
necessary to combine manpower, machinery and material into new 
MOTIVATIONAL ASSUMPTION: Profit maximisation 
BEHAVIOURAL ASSUMPTION: Maximise Expected Value of each tender 
FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: Constant distribution of competing tenders can be determined from 
previous encounters. Tender is cost plus a mark-up based on maximising expected value 
RESTRICTIONS ON RANGE OF VARIABLES: No restrictions 
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS: Competitive tendering only  
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buildings.  
 
We have different markets because the skills required for 
different types of projects are different. On the other hand we 
have distinct markets for each type of projects. There is for 
instance virtually no difference between the skills required to 
construct different single family dwellings and any participant 
in that market can produce any of the products traded within 
that market. The same is true also for the market for driveways 
or market for high rise office blocks. The building industry is 
selling services, and within each market, the services being 
sold are virtually identical. 
 
If we have an identical product for sale and a tendering process 
that communicates to the buyer who is willing to sell and for 
what price, we have a market and a market price, and a theory 
that determines how that price is derived is a theory of 
pricing, even if the product is traded in bundles of different 
sizes each time.  
 
 
CONSTANT MARK-UP 
 
The second characteristic of the pricing model as presented by 
Gates is that the strategy for maximising profit is a mark-up 
that is constant, over time and in practice, from tender to 
tender. This is another crucial difference between on the one 
hand Friedman’s concept of a strategy for a single tender and on 
the other hand, Gates’ general theory of tendering as well as 
extension of Friedman’s model (e.g. Park, 1962, 1963, 1964, 
1966, Park and Chapin, 1992). Friedman assumes, for the purpose 
of estimation, "that each competitor is likely to bid as he has 
done in the past" (p 107), a ceteris paribus condition that may 
not necessarily be an actual representation of reality, but may 
be sufficiently close to convey a competitive advantage to the 
user. 
 
Gates, being less clear, does not state the assumptions 
explicitly, but uses empirical data derived over a period of 
several years to establish the probability of success, and a 
technique which explicitly excludes the possibilities of 
systematic changes in the mark-up as a correspondence rule for 
calculating the probabilities of success at different mark-ups. 
After having calculated the optimum mark-up for competition with 
firms A, B and C, Gates states that this optimum mark-up is 
constant over time, because this is "the best mark-up to include 
whenever your competitors are only A, B and C" (p 86, emphasis 
added. There is no need to re-estimate the probability density 
functions at any stage or for any reason. This statement 
specifically excludes the possibility of systematic variations 
in the mark-up. 
 
The fact that probabilities are being assigned to the bids at 
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all assumes that bids occur in a manner amenable to statistical 
treatment.  This implies that bids are fundamentally random in 
nature, drawn from an underlying probability density function 
with fixed parameters.  To estimate the value of these 
parameters empirically for construction contract bidding 
inevitably involves making assumptions about the stability of 
these parameters over time as observations (bid values) of a 
sufficient number are simply not available at a single point in 
time.  Indeed it has even been argued that sufficient numbers of 
observations cannot be available over even over time (Curtis and 
Maines, 1973). 
 
This raises a vital issue of theoretical relevance.  Firstly, as 
the empirical demands of parameter estimation involves the 
practical assumption that bid pdfs do not change over time, it 
can be argued that it logically follows that the same assumption 
is implied theoretically.  To accept this argument also means 
accepting that all practical behaviour has implied theoretical 
bases.  This is a pivotal issue with deep philosophical 
traditions and means, for instance, rejecting the notion of 
atheoretical behaviour as absurd.  Current work on the 
philosophical basis of general economic theories (e.g. Blaug, 
19??), however, overwhelmingly supports the acceptance the 
implied theory argument.  Economic theory is built entirely on 
that which is implied from practice and therefore without 
implied theory there can be no economic theory. 
 
Similarly, the tendering theory that is implied by Gates holds 
that market conditions or the competitors’ capacity utilisations 
in themselves do not influence the behaviour of any of the 
competitors in any systematic way as his very use of statistical 
models assumes that all variations in tenders conveniently 
originate from unsystematic or random variations in the 
competitors’ and/or own cost estimates and/or mark-ups. 
 
It follows, therefore, that, if systematic changes in bidding 
behaviour do occur in reality, as for instance in different 
markets or in response to changes in demand, the theory cannot 
hold, for the mark-ups can no longer be regarded as random.  
There are also consequences in practice too2.  A further 
                                                          
2
 Cf for instance a set of temperature records from different 
Australian weather stations covering all seasons. This is a 
frequency distribution and also a probability distribution for a 
temperature reading at a random weather station at a random 
time. However, it is not a good predictor for a temperature 
reading at a specified location at a specified time such as 
Darwin on New Year’s Eve or Snowy Mountains in mid winter. In 
the same way, the records on mark-ups from different markets and 
different market conditions are not good indicators of the 
relevant mark-ups for a specific project in a specified market 
and in a specified set of market conditions.  Mark-ups 
established when the market is overheated are not valid when 
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difficulty, common in many areas of economic theory, is that, 
paradoxically, the mere application of the prescriptions derived 
from the theory is sufficient to undermine the theory from which 
they have been derived.  In this case, the assumption that the 
competitors do not modify their behaviour at any time in 
response to the use of the strategy as developed by Gates is 
unlikely to be correct if Gates' strategy is of value. This, as 
indicated below, is a crucial difference between tendering 
theory and game theory. 
 
In terms of using the calculated probability density functions, 
Gates starts with the situation where the competitors and their 
probability density functions are known, but extends the 
analysis to situations where the competitors are not known but 
are assumed to be "typical bidders": an average of bidders 
encountered in the past. Under these conditions, the optimum 
mark-up would remain constant for the typical case with n 
typical competitors. The probability density function would 
change only in response to changes in the number of competitors 
or to the presence of specific competitors. If, on the other 
hand, any of these conditions is violated, the probability 
distribution for each tender process would be unique, hence the 
optimum mark-up would also be unique for each tender process. 
 
For each tender, the tender price is set by the cost estimate 
plus a constant percentage-mark-up. For obvious reasons, the 
bidder will not always be successful. After all, the bidder is 
aiming only for a predetermined fraction of the contracts, and 
the accuracy (or rather lack of accuracy) of the bidder’s own 
and the competitors’ cost estimates of their, as yet unknown, 
future costs will ensure that there are no certainties. However, 
if the probability density function parameters can be accurately 
assessed and the cost estimates are closely distributed, the 
winning bid will be close to the own bid. The price, which for 
each contract is set by the winning tender, is based on the cost 
plus a mark-up from a given probability density function. The 
bids will vary somewhat between different bidders because the 
uncertainties in assessing in advance, the extent of services 
required, but within narrow limits, the probabilities of winning 
with any price will be constant. This will be the case across 
the market, and differences in the prices offered between 
different bidders and projects will reflect random differences 
alone. It then follows that all bidders, if they all behave 
rationally in accordance with tendering theory, will apply a 
given mark-up consistent with the number of competing bidders, 
and any differences in bids will be the result of differences in 
the original cost estimate. 
 
Tendering theory as implied in Gates' strategy is a theory that 
assumes constant mark-ups unaffected by variations in demand. 
The price is calculated as costs plus a constant mark-up, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
demand is low and the competition intense. 
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potential activities and counter-strategies of competitors are 
assumed away. To the extent that there are any differences 
between different competitors, these arise from the necessity to 
estimate the cost prior to the execution of the contract and any 
aberrations caused by the process of submitting a single, 
unchangeable bid rather than the more conventional method of 
pricing the product when the cost is known. 
 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GAME THEORY AND TENDERING THEORY 
 
Before progressing further, it is appropriate to discuss the 
validity of the claim, implicit in the use of maximising 
strategies and probabilities and in the references to game 
theory and von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s theoretical work, 
that tendering theory is based on game theory. 
 
Game theory is the analysis of problems involving the 
interactions of rational agents. In a zero sum game such as 
tendering, where the winner takes all, this requires the 
assumption that the competitors adopt the most profitable 
counter strategy, and the selection of the "best" defensive 
measures (Kohler, 1982). Similarly, Shubik (1955) argues that 
game theory applies when  
 
 the outcome of the behaviour of firms and individuals does not 
depend on their own actions alone nor those combined by chance, but 
also on the actions of others who sometimes oppose, sometimes 
fortify, those of the former (p viii). 
 
The basic assumption in game theory is that the pay-off depends 
on the strategy selected by that player and the strategy 
selected by the other players (Bomoul, 1977, p 427). This 
"Conscious Conflict" is an absolute requirement for game theory 
to apply (Naylor and Vernon, 1969, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989) 
and any predictions that are inconsistent with a presumed if 
vaguely specified, rationality are rejected. Game theory 
requires that all players consider their respective strategies 
and select the most appropriate strategy assuming that all other 
players do the same. It does not apply to a situation where one 
player alone is allowed to adopt a preferred strategy without 
any attempts from other players to modify their strategies in 
response. The assumption in tendering theory that there is no 
response, no modification of the behaviour of other players 
violates the most fundamental assumption of game theory. 
 
There are also problems with game theory for the kind of complex 
problems tendering theory represents. Arrow (1994), discussing 
the fundamental concept of game theory points out that each firm 
depends on a conjecture of other firms' actions, but there is no 
reason to believe that these actions should be consistent. 
Schmalensee (1988) and Friedman (1956) similarly suggest that 
the assumption that boundedly rational humans can solve the very 
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complex problems encountered in real life seems to push the 
rationality assumption very far indeed.  
 
In addition to these problems, the predictions of game-
theoretical models often seem delicate. Important qualitative 
features of equilibria often depend critically on whether prices 
or quantities are choice variables, on whether discrete or 
continuous time is assumed, on whether moves are sequential or 
simultaneous, and - perhaps most disturbing of all - on how 
players with incomplete information are assumed to alter their 
beliefs in response to events that cannot occur in equilibrium 
(Schmalensee, 1988). Arguments about learning taking place 
during games do not improve the situation. Allowing for rational 
learning simply requires the formulation of successive new and 
more complex games as behaviour changes (Axelrod, 1984). 
 
It can also be demonstrated that if mark-up is regarded as a 
continuous variable and hence infinitely divisible so that it 
represents an infinite number of possible strategies while the-
pay-off is discontinuous as in either winning or not winning, as 
we have in tendering theory, then there is no pure strategy 
equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989, pp 270 - 71). Hence, 
tendering theory cannot theoretically represent an optimum game 
strategy, making it absolutely clear that, despite the 
terminology in Gates’ original paper suggesting otherwise, 
tendering theory cannot be classified as a game theoretical 
approach to pricing. 
 
 
TENDERING THEORY AS DECISION THEORY 
 
Gates (1967, p 75) referred to tendering theory as a strategy of 
bidding. Consequently, tendering theory is often seen as simply 
a prescriptive or normative theory rather than as descriptive or 
positive. Tendering theory, according to this argument, is no 
more than a model of rational behaviour, and rationality 
according to this argument, is a normative concept. Seen that 
way, tendering theory like almost all other social science 
theories would be normative theories, irrelevant to the 
explanation of actual behaviour (Rosenberg, 1994). 
 
However, in a normative theory, the 'ought to' also implies 
'being able to'. Tendering theory is not only about how 
tendering 'ought to' be performed, but also an explanation of 
achievable rationality. Rationality, whether aimed for or 
postulated as an axiom, is about outcomes (Elser, 1989), which 
if achieved, will have implications that, at least in principle, 
can be observed, tested and verified or falsified. Hence, the a 
priori argument that theories like tendering theory that 
stipulate rationality and can also be formulated in a normative 
way as decision rules cannot also be descriptive or positive is 
invalid. Such an argument must be empirically derived. 
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The counter argument to this view is that it is widely accepted 
that there are sanctions that apply for the violation of 
rational behaviour. Only rational behaviour has some chance of 
surviving in business (Alchian, 1950), or, in a more general 
form: irrational behaviour cannot be afforded (Becker, 1962). 
 
A main difference between tendering theory and the theory of 
decision analysis (or, as it is commonly referred to, decision 
theory), is that the tendering theory stipulates a universal 
maximisation objective, while decision theory provides the 
analytical tools to maximise any individual utility function 
irrespective of what this utility function is (Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976). Also in this interpretation, Gates’ model is very 
much a positive theory of price determination. 
 
 
THEORY OF AUCTIONS. 
 
The process of obtaining new jobs through tendering with 
simultaneous single sealed bid tenders for unique projects prior 
to the actual cost being known, has so many aspects to it that 
there has been very little work done on the actual outcome, the 
price. This is where auction theories could potentially be 
useful. 
 
Auction theory comes in many models designed to deal with many 
different situations. Auction models are distinguished by the 
number of bidders and/or sellers, by symmetric or asymmetric 
information between bidders and seller or between bidders, the 
information available, type of auction, type of bidding, single 
or sequential auctions, finite or infinite sequences, equal or 
individual-private valuations of the item auctioned, cooperative 
or non-cooperative bidding, with or without a reserve price, 
with or without commitment to accept the result of the auction, 
willingness to accept risk and so on. The empirical importance 
of tendering is reflected in the number of papers, articles and 
books devoted to various aspects of auctions. Tendering is a 
common method of procurement for many different types of goods 
and the value of goods traded through auctions or tenders is 
huge (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). 
 
The type of auction applicable to tendering is the non-
cooperative, simultaneous, single sealed bid type with 
individual-private valuations, with, if not perfect, at least 
extensive public information, a large number of bidders for an 
infinite or long sequence of auctions. The significance of a 
single bid auction is that the single bid is assumed to express 
both the private valuation of the contract and the strategy 
employed to achieve success (Kagel, Harstad and Levin, 1987). 
However, the potential distortion of including a strategy in the 
bid is limited. The so called Revenue-Equivalence Theorem 
suggests that the single sealed bid auction on average yields 
the same price as the English, the Dutch and the second price 
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sealed bid auctions (Vickrey, 1961, Harris and Raviv, 1981, 
Holt, 1980, Reiley and Samuelson, 1981, Kagel and Levin, 1993). 
 
Applying this to tendering in the building industry, there is 
one more bit of information required: what happens in repeated 
auctions. Auctions are one of the areas where experimental 
results are available, so that we have replication without the 
violation of any ceteris paribus conditions and therefore real 
opportunities to test the theorems. Evaluating such experimental 
results, Roth (1988, p 1006) comments: 
 
 One of the striking and by now well known results from the 
literature is that ... it is possible to observe traders converge to 
competitive equilibrium, in repeated markets . . . often in 
relatively few periods, as traders gain experience, through 
repetition, with the parameters of the market. 
 
Similarly, McAfee and McMillan (1987b) summarise that auctions 
serve to aggregate dispersed information and "Provided there are 
many bidders, and provided information is sufficiently dispersed 
among the bidders, the price equals the item's true value..." It 
is quite obvious that the tendering process as such does not 
inhibit the development of a competitive equilibrium price and 
if the term "true value" means anything in this context, it must 
refer to the value the item would have in a competitive 
equilibrium if it was traded by some other method. Indeed, 
auctions are the answer to Arrow's criticism that neo-classical 
economic theory does not provide a mechanism for the process of 
price adjustments. Auction theory provides an explicit model of 
how prices adjust to demand and supply (1959).  
 
In summary, auction theory does not support the tendering theory 
with its concept of the tender as a combination of a true cost 
and an independent strategy for winning. As has been 
demonstrated above, neither can tendering theory support a game 
theory equilibrium. 
 
 
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDERING THEORY 
 
The major interest in the development of tendering theory dates 
back to the period 1967 - when Gates published his paper - up to 
the early 1980's, although there are more recent-re-statements 
of the theory, one of the more comprehensive being Construction 
Bidding: Strategic Pricing for Profit by Park and Chapin in 
1992. Most of the discussion, as suggested above, has concerned 
the differences in aggregation of the probabilities of being 
successful against other builders individually. Avoiding that 
problem altogether, Hanssmann and Rivett (1959), Sugrue (1980), 
Carr (1967, 1982, 1987a), and Seydel and Olson (1990), without 
changing the essential assumption of constant probability 
density functions, reformulated the problem to that of being 
successful against the lowest competitive bid only. 
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A number of writers have introduced basic neo-classical micro-
economic concepts into the models. De Neufville, Hani and Lesage 
(1977), Carr (1982) and Willenbrock (1973) suggested the 
maximisation of expected utility rather than the maximisation of 
expected value, while Goodman and Burmeister (1976), Knode and 
Swanson (1978) introduced the possibility of capacity 
constraints and Carr (1987b) uses opportunity costs rather than 
money values. This was further developed by Seydel and Olson 
(1990) who constructed a more complex preference function which 
included risk and continuity of work as well as profit. Flanagan 
and Norman (1982) examined the consequences of approaching the 
capacity limit in terms of increases in the Marginal Cost and 
referred to the capacity limit as where the Marginal Cost is 
equal to Marginal Revenue. Gates has also proposed that there 
may be different markets, where the bidding strategies may be 
different (Gates, 1976a). 
 
Some or all of these modifications may be justified and also 
quite consistent with the original tendering theory, which here 
has been taken to be Friedman's model, extended as a general 
theory by Park and others, or Gates’ model. With the possible 
exception of Flanagan and Norman, they do not contradict the 
core of tendering theory: the assumption that variations in the 
competitors' bidding are the results of unsystematic variations 
of cost estimates and/or mark-ups, nor the central behavioural 
assumption that the preferable strategy is to maximise the 
expected value, in money or utility, of each bid. Certainly, 
none of the proposed modifications has been generally accepted. 
In the most recent and very comprehensive restatement of 
tendering theory by Park and Chapin (1992) none of these 
developments is incorporated, or even discussed at length. 
 
More 'radical' reformulations have been proposed by Beeston 
(1982) and Grinyer and Whittaker (1973). Beeston suggest 
smoothing, i.e. to assign a higher weight to the most recent 
events and correspondingly lower to more distant events when 
calculating the probability density functions3. This is 
equivalent to saying that the tendering theory as implied by 
Gates is fundamentally flawed for determining tender prices, but 
if we change the correspondence rule and drop the assumption of 
constant probabilities, what is left, which is essentially 
Friedman’s strategy for a single tender, can be used as a simple 
'naive' forecasting model where existing trends may be 
                                                          
3
 A system of different weights for previous tenders had been 
advanced as early as 1969, by Morin and Clough. The paper, while 
published two years after Gates’, retains some of the 
characteristics of Friedman’s model, including the same ceteris 
paribus condition but presented as a general model of tendering 
as proposed by Park (1966) and Gates. The weights were to ensure 
that the technique could be used even if the ceteris paribus 
condition was not satisfied.  
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extrapolated. This translates into a slight modification of the 
technique for assessing the probabilities developed by Friedman, 
necessitated by the dropping of the ceteris paribus condition. 
 
Grinyer and Whittaker suggest that, over time, there are 
variations in the competitiveness in the market, and that the 
problem can be solved by including as an additional variable 
'managerial judgement'. Apart from the problem of formulating 
'managerial judgement' so that it becomes a meaningful and 
quantifiable operational variable, it seems to be only a small 
step away from using managerial judgement without going to the 
trouble of calculating incorrect probabilities of success in 
advance. This modification, like Beeston’s, rejects the central 
core of the theory without apparently noticing. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TENDERING THEORY AS A THEORY OF PRICING 
 
As suggested above, in the typical case with n unknown 
competitors, tendering theory states that the tenderer's offer 
comprises an estimated cost plus a constant mark-up. This offer 
or bid may not always win, but each time it does, the offer 
becomes the price (see McCaffer and Thorpe, 1991), and 
presumably the number of bids and the probability of winning the 
contract ensures an adequate work load. This is in no way 
different from any other sales situation where the buyer has a 
choice between several sellers buying only one product, 
implicitly rejecting the offers of all other sellers. 
 
If n changes, it means that the expected value of all  mark-ups 
will change, and hence it is likely that the optimum mark-up 
will also change, as, indeed it may if one or more competitors 
are recognised as non-typical bidders. However, the fundamental 
characteristic of the theory is that prices are not affected by 
short term changes in demand and or capacity utilisation. None 
of the proposed changes would affect these basic characteristics 
of tendering theory. 
 
 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THEORIES 
 
Although there are no generally agreed criteria for evaluating a  
theory, the most commonly cited requirements of theories include 
the ability of the theory to make accurate forecasts, high 
informative content of the forecasts, applicability or realism 
of the assumptions, consistency with the predominant paradigm 
and finally simplicity of the theory (Runeson, 1983). Evaluating 
tendering theory in some of these respects should therefore give 
us some indication of the relevance of the theory. 
 
For the ability of making accurate, informative forecasts, we 
will now look at how tendering theory deals with the effects of 
a change in demand and how that compares to available empirical 
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studies. For applicability, we will examine the assumption of 
randomness of bids and the assumption that tender prices are 
costs plus a predetermined mark-up used in tendering theory. 
 
 
A CHANGE IN DEMAND 
 
One of the characteristics of the markets for building and 
construction services is rapid substantial changes in effective 
demand. For the industry as a whole, these changes may be ten or 
more per cent per year, for individual markets they may be even 
more substantial, sometimes reaching fifty or more per cent in a 
year. These changes may be prolonged over several years. In NSW 
the mid-1983 trough in building activity represented a halving 
of the value of construction over the preceding peak and was 
followed by an increase by a factor of 2.5 over the succeeding 
six years (Donoghue and Munro, 1991, also Anderssen and McEvoy, 
1990). It is therefore, from an informative point of view, 
important that a theory of pricing can effectively incorporate 
the effects of changes in demand. 
 
According to tendering theory, a change in demand will not 
change tendering behaviour, as this would represent a systematic 
change in strategy, and systematic changes are excluded by 
assumption (Shash, 1993). Tendering theory states that the 
probability density functions of all known competitors and the 
average competitor or, alternatively, the lowest bid are 
constant and given. It states that tender prices will change 
only if costs or the composition or number of competitors 
change, but there is nothing in the theory to suggest that this 
will happen as a result of any change in demand. The mark-up 
(profit), for the typical case with n typical competitors is a 
function of n and will therefore change only if n changes. 
 
Empirical studies have, however, shown quite conclusively that 
prices do change in response to changes in the level of demand, 
or more precisely, in conjunction with changes in the level of 
activity in the industry. De Neufville et al (1977) found that 
prices change with the number of competitors, as predicted by 
the tendering theory, but also that the price level is 
systematically different in what they refer to as "good" and 
"bad" years. Carr and Sandahl (1978) demonstrated that the 
tender price changes much more than does cost when the demand 
changes. Runeson and Bennett (1983) found systematic changes in 
the price level in response to changes in demand and in the 
utilisation of capacity in the industry, and Runeson (1988a), 
investigating a single market found that prices systematically 
changed by more than plus/minus 20 per cent over the business 
cycle in response to changes in the level of activity in the 
market, even when the number of competitors was held constant. 
It was estimated that 85 per cent of these price changes could 
be explained by changes in demand and capacity utilisation, i.e. 
in variables describing market conditions. The number of 
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competitors was found to have a minor impact only, with an 
additional competitor reducing the tender price by only 0.7 per 
cent on average (Runeson, 1990).  
 
Similarly, McCaffer, McCaffrey and Thorpe (1983) found a strong 
relationship between the price level and the level of 
competitiveness in the building industry, but their results, 
based on a sample drawn from several different markets, also 
indicate that market conditions may be quite different for 
different types of buildings or in different regions, indicating 
that the industry is indeed divided into several non-competing 
markets. That tender prices change in response to market 
conditions is clearly reflected in the use of so called Tender 
Price Indices that are now compiled in an increasing number of 
countries, sometimes with different indices for different types 
of construction and different regions. Sweden, for instance, 
publishes two residential building price (output) indices, one 
for medium and one for high density construction. These indices 
frequently move at different rates or in a different direction 
to input cost indices and sometimes, as in 1976 and 1984, in 
different directions to each other (Byggindex, 1992). 
 
Unfortunately, price changes do not, on their own, either 
confirm or falsify the theory. In tendering theory, the price 
level as such is not an issue, as it is concerned only with 
mark-ups. The prices will however change if cost changes. A 
pragmatic way of looking at this is that in order to expand 
capacity, new factors of production have to be employed. These 
new factors are likely to be less skilled or specialised and 
therefore less productive than those previously employed, hence 
lowering the overall productivity and increasing costs. The 
process is symmetrical. When capacity is reduced, the less 
productive factors of production leave the industry and overall 
productivity increases and the cost level falls. The impact of 
this can be quite substantial. From 1950 to 1980 the annual rate 
in productivity growth across the construction industry in the 
United States ranged from - 9.3 to + 7.4 per cent per year 
(Weber and Lippiatt, 1983). 
 
This should obviously have an impact through the cost estimate. 
In addition, if it is assumed, as did Runeson and Bennett 
(1983), that the average number of bids is a function of the 
available capacity in the industry, upturns and downturns in the 
level of activity will be accompanied by price changes generated 
by changing numbers of tenderers. The testing of the theory must 
therefore, at least to some extent, be concerned with the 
process of price formation rather than the traditional, 
positivist method of examining the outcome. As the process 
cannot be observed in the equivalent way to the outcome, this 
raises some doubts about the results of any testing. Motives and 
intentions cannot be observed or measured but only inferred. 
 
However, some indication is given by the magnitude of the price 
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changes reported by Runeson (1988a). If labour contributes 
approximately fifty per cent to the total cost of building, 
plus/minus twenty per cent change in the price of construction 
over the business cycle would require that the productivity 
increases by a hundred per cent from the boom to the recession, 
which appears excessive. It also appears that it is the process 
of change in the level of output that determines the price 
rather than, as would be expected, the absolute level of output. 
 
The alternative assumption, that mark-ups are not constant but 
change in response to changes in demand, has been reported in 
several studies. Andrews and Brunner (1975), in one of the 
earliest economic studies of the building industry, found that 
all builders change their tendering strategy systematically in 
response to changes in demand. Grinyer and Whittaker, (1973), 
Gaver and Zimmerman (1977), Beeston (1982), Flanagan and Norman 
(1982, 1985), Upson (1987), Skitmore et al (1990), Harding 
(1992), Sash and Abdul-Hadid (1992) as well as a number of 
unpublished studies have found that market conditions are an 
important determinant of mark-up strategy. This is supported 
also by Harrison, (1981), March, (1987), and Hillebrandt and 
Cannon, (1990). Auxiliary support is provided by observed 
differences in the distribution of bids over time, as reported 
by Johnston (1978) and Skitmore (1986b). 
 
It is also well documented in other industries that some of the 
price movements caused by rapid changes in demand is absorbed in 
changes in quality (Esher, 1982, Gal-Or, 1985, Powell, 1989). 
The same response has been reported also for the building 
industry (Niss, 1965, Rajab, 1981). 
 
A major study of a firm's profit encompassing 221 projects over 
28 years by Chan et al (1996) also found a highly significant 
relationship between market conditions and actual profit on 
individual projects. The magnitude of the differences was far 
greater (-26 + 35 per cent) than anything that could be 
attributed to different numbers of tenderers alone, and the most 
likely determinant was differences in mark-up strategy during 
different phases of the business cycle. 
 
While tendering theory can accommodate price changes as long as 
they apply across the industry, it cannot allow for systematic 
changes in the mark-up strategy (Shash, 1993). Any measurable 
systematic change in behaviour by one or all competitors will 
not be taken into account in estimating their probability 
density functions parameters. Hence, it is clear from these 
empirical studies that tendering theory, as implied by bidding 
strategists, does not reflect accurately what happens in a 
market for building management services when demand changes. The 
price level in the industry is determined by the level of 
activity in the industry, and in the short run when capacity 
cannot change, the adjustment to the new market situation takes 
place through changes in the price level as the mark-ups of all 
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tenderers in the market change. 
 
 
THE ASSUMPTION OF RANDOM VARIATIONS IN TENDERS 
 
As demonstrated above, it is an essential assumption of the 
tendering theory that the probability density function of the 
competitors' tenders and the own cost estimates is constant. 
That requires a pattern of price differences originating in 
random variations rather than systematic variations.  
 
Technically, it is of course also possible that there are random 
variations in the cost calculations that result from 
subcontractors who unsystematically submit different bids to 
different contractors to be used in the cost estimates or if the 
cost estimators used different sets of subcontractors, with 
unsystematically different cost estimates. While it is 
potentially possible that this can occur, it represents a 
logically indefensible position to build a theory around the 
assumption that there is, as stipulated in the tendering theory, 
a cost and a constant probability density function which with 
several bidders lead to fairly close tenders in the case of head 
contractors but not subcontractors. 
 
There is some evidence that there are informal links between 
head and sub contractors that are not based on price alone 
(Eccles, 1981, Runeson and Uher, 1984, 1986, Uher and Runeson, 
1984, 1985) and of differences between the prices of different 
subcontractors (MBA Vic & DHC 1984, Runeson 1987, 1988b). 
However, there is no indication that these differences are 
substantial or systematic enough to account for more than at 
most half and probably much less of the variations in tenders 
normally reported with standard deviations typically of 6 - 8 
per cent (e.g. Ashworth and Skitmore, c: 1983). On the contrary, 
Runeson and Uher (1984) found that differences in sub-
contractors' tenders were based on anticipated differences in 
timing of payments or in work organisation and therefore 
reflected anticipated costs or productivity. 
 
In the literature, there are constant references to unexplained 
variations in tenders. Kaka and Price (1993) suggest that due to 
errors, a tenderer would always arrive at different prices for 
the same project, Lang and Mills (1979) refer to "ever present" 
mistakes, Van Der Meulen and Money (1984) liken tendering to a 
game of darts and Gates (1977) calls it "the game of the greater 
fool". While these statements would seem to indicate that 
tendering is a "hit and miss" process, not substantially 
different from a lottery or a game of chance, this is not, in 
our experience, the attitude among the people involved in 
actually preparing or submitting tenders in the industry. While 
there is still an element of chance, the degree of uncertainty 
appears much less prevalent among practitioners than among 
academics. Part of this difference in attitude may be because 
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tendering is not such a random process as assumed in academic 
literature. 
 
There are strong indications that the variability in tenders is 
not primarily the result of a random process. McCaffer (1976), 
for instance, presents an analysis of sequences of bids from 
individual tenderers relative to the bids of their competitors, 
which shows a very clear, consistent non-random pattern. 
According to this analysis, the tenderers typically reduce their 
bids gradually, relative to their competitors when they are 
unsuccessful until they win a contract. However, immediately 
after a tenderer has been successful, the following bid 
increases sharply in relative terms, and a new cycle of gradual 
decrease starts. In the study, 84.24 per cent of winning tenders 
were preceded by at least two consecutive decreases in relative 
price, and in 65.41 per cent of the cases, there was a sequence 
of five or more consecutive decreases before a successful tender 
(p 133)4. Hence, in less than 16 per cent of the cases the 
successful tender was not preceded by a sequence of falling 
tender prices. This work has been duplicated for subcontractors 
by Yiin (1987) who found exactly the same behaviour. Using a 
different technique, Griffis (1992) has obtained very similar, 
highly significant results. These studies strongly indicate that 
there is very little randomness in tendering (see also Flanagan 
and Norman, 1985). 
 
If tenders are less random than assumed, this poses two 
questions: (i) if tenders are known not to be competitive, why 
are they submitted at all; and (ii) if tenderers can estimate 
with a high degree of accuracy, why are there such variations in 
the tenders for a typical project. 
 
The answer to the first question is quite simple. All projects 
are unique in terms of the quantities of building management 
services required. Therefore, one practicable way to obtain 
information about current market conditions and how they affect 
the price level is to complete an estimate of what is required, 
and see how that relates to the winning tender price. Only by 
participating and tendering on a continuing basis, can a 
tenderer keep abreast of what is happening in the market. On a 
more pragmatic level, contractors are also often submitting bids 
to show that they are still in the market. This is especially so 
when they have been invited to tender. Griffis (1992) and Upson 
(1987) report that clients often give the perception that a 
failure to bid will prejudice the firm in the future. One 
obvious and well known consequence of this is the so called 
"cover bid" which in a typical analysis cannot be distinguished 
from a genuinely competitive bid (Skitmore, 1986b). 
                                                          
4
 The data are for tendering to the public sector only. As most 
contractors would also tender for private sector contracts, it 
is likely that the sequences are in fact even more pronounced 
than these figures indicate (McCaffer, 1976, p 136). 
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The most likely answer to the second question is that tenderers 
start with a high mark-up that is systematically reduced to make 
the tenders more competitive as the need for a new contract 
becomes more urgent as described by McCaffer's cusum curve. It 
should be noted that this contradicts the assumptions necessary 
for the construction of probability density functions of 
competitors’ bids. 
 
 
RANDOM VARIATIONS IN TENDERS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Tendering theory, with tenders based on estimated costs plus a 
mark-up facing the competitors' constant probability density 
functions, does not explain the observed distribution of 
tenders, but relies on various, not always very likely ad hoc 
rationalisations. In the end, it does not necessarily need to 
produce results that are inconsistent with the observed 
differences between bids or behaviour such as that demonstrated 
by the cusum curve. However, in order to fit observed behaviour, 
the central assumption of unchangeable probability density 
functions needs to be reformulated. The behaviour required to 
produce a cusum curve is conditional on a logical inconsistency 
in the assumptions and invalidates part of the core of the 
theory. 
 
The conceptual problem with tendering theory in this context is 
that there is no allowance for continuity in the theory. It is 
not that the theory is static, it is that it is central to the 
theory that the outcome of one tender process is not affected by 
the outcome of previous events and does not affect subsequent 
tender processes. There is, as a consequence, no market, no 
price level, no change in behaviour and certainly no learning. 
This is presumably justified by the uniqueness of each project 
and the failure to consider the firm rather than the project as 
the appropriate unit of analysis. 
 
 
MAXIMISING PROFIT 
 
The strategy for maximising profit is to maximise the expected 
value of every single bid. This strategy, the maximisation of 
the expected value of each event, is an appropriate strategy for 
a game of poker or betting on horses or any other game for 
money, where the cost of each event must be balanced against the 
gains and the best way of doing so is to seek the most 
favourable combination of probability of success and value of 
pay-out. The problem with tendering, from the point of view of 
tendering theory, is that it is not a game of odds for money. 
The problem is not to maximise the expected value of a set of 
potential tenders but to maximise the return to a given 
productive capacity. The error of logic should be apparent. The 
two objectives can only give the same result if there are a 
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predetermined number of contracts that the firm must bid for, 
and there is no cost penalty for not reaching or exceeding the 
most probable work load. 
 
This would seldom be the case. In reality there is a choice of 
contracts to bid for or not to bid for, and winning a contract 
means that part of the firm's resources is locked up for the 
duration of the contract so that the firm is unable to compete 
for potentially more profitable contracts. Losing a tender, on 
the other hand, may only mean that the firm can tender for any 
number of other contracts, but it may, in other circumstances 
mean that the firm's resources may be unutilised at high costs 
for a period of time (Niss, 1965, Mannering, 1970, Burton, 1972, 
South, 1979, Fellows et al, 1983). A numerical example should 
illustrate this point in an intuitive way. If we assume that the 
tenderer will have unutilised capacity for one project, and look 
at two extreme cases: (i) there is a large number of contracts 
to bid for, and (ii) there is only one contract to bid for, it 
should be obvious that maximising the expected value is not 
necessarily the profit maximising strategy.  
 
If we also assume that at a mark-up of 1 per cent, the 
probability of winning the contract is 1.0, at 3 per cent it is 
0.5 and at 10 per cent it is 0.1, tendering theory would suggest 
that since a mark-up of 3 per cent has the highest expected 
value (1.5 as compared to 1 for the alternatives), the profit 
maximising strategy is to use this mark-up in both cases above. 
However, a rational strategy for most people would probably be 
in the first case to submit a sufficient number of bids to 
obtain the desired contract with a mark-up of 10 per cent, and 
in the second case to submit a bid with a 1 per cent mark-up to 
avoid both the risk of getting no profit and the risk of paying 
the cost of carrying unutilised capacity. 
 
It can similarly be demonstrated that for more typical, 
intermediate situations, the maximisation of the expected value 
of all bids will not maximise profit to the firm. A more 
rational strategy would be to vary the mark-up as indicated in 
McCaffer's cusum curve. Winning a project too early when the 
firm has no spare capacity necessitates a higher price as the 
firm must pay a cost penalty for operating above its optimum 
capacity and winning it too late means that it has to carry 
unutilised capacity (see also Eastham, 1988, and Ahmad and 
Minkrah, 1988). The logical fallacy of ignoring the capacity of 
the firm is obvious. This is where Friedman's original model has 
been distorted. Friedman’s model originally offered a simple 
conceptual model for a single or several simultaneous bids, not 
a strategy for sequential bidding with choice of projects to bid 
for. As such it represents one of several potential rational 
strategies. 
 
It is difficult to construct a set of assumptions that are 
consistent with using the maximisation of expected value as a 
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strategy to maximise profit. Essential assumptions are that the 
number of tenders is fixed, and that the capacity utilisation 
which results from the tendering process is irrelevant. The 
circumstances where the latter applies are especially difficult 
to specify. 
 
 
THE ACCURACY OF ESTIMATES 
 
One of the problems of following the discussion in the 
literature on tendering is the absence of a common terminology 
and the indiscriminate use of terms like "price" or "cost" to 
denote a range of very different concepts. The term "accuracy" 
is, even in this context, an especially misused and abused term. 
 
It is easy to demonstrate, as Fine (1975) has done, that when 
there are random errors in the cost estimates on which tenders 
are based, the tenders will be different. However, because 
random errors in cost estimates will lead to unsystematic 
differences in tenders, it does not follow that all, or indeed 
any observed differences in tenders must be unsystematic and due 
to inaccuracies in the cost estimates, as tendering theory 
assumes. This particular form of logical error - if A, then B;  
B exist, hence A is true - is generally referred to as affirming 
the consequent. 
 
There are two problems with taking the distribution of tenders 
as a measure of accuracy of cost estimating: (i) what is 
calculated is not accuracy - because the accuracy of cost 
estimates, by definition, can only be assessed in relation to 
actual costs - but conformity to other tenders, which is 
something totally different, and (ii) it is doubtful if a single 
event that is the result of an array of random influences that 
are unknown at the time of the estimate, can be said to 
estimated accurately or not in any meaningful sense. 
 
The failure to assess the accuracy of tenders in terms of the 
actual costs is what makes it possible for Park and Chapin 
(1992) to state that:  
 
 A good detailed estimate should generally be accurate within 5 per 
cent. Even so, on the average, actual costs may vary by as much as 
20 percent from the estimated costs ... (p. 194, emphasis added).  
 
which makes no sense if the purpose of an estimate is to 
estimate the actual cost! However, the implications of the 
statement are confusing not only from the point of view of the 
logic of the authors, but also for the logic of tendering 
theory. The statement certainly gives no indication that 
estimators are capable of estimating actual costs. In fact, 
since normally most tenders are grouped reasonably close 
together, well within the twenty per cent mentioned, it suggests 
that now and then, actually quite often - for some unknown 
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reason - all estimators get it wrong by about the same magnitude 
and in the same direction and at the same time. This requires a 
behaviour that is far removed from the assumption of rationality 
that is central to most aspects of economic reasoning. 
 
Park and Chapin cite no empirical study for their differences of 
20 per cent, and it would be easy to dismiss the figure, were it 
not for the findings in a very recent study of the differences 
between tenders and actual cost. The study, based on all 
contracts for new buildings from a successful firm (n = 221) 
over a twenty-eight year period found that the actual accuracy 
was indeed very low, with the range of differences between 
tender plus variations and actual costs from - 26 to + 35 per 
cent of the tender price and a coefficient of variation of 9.58 
(Chan et al, 1996). 
 
However, the real problem for the applicability of tendering 
theory was that the distribution of profits and losses revealed 
in the study was systematic rather than random as would have 
been the case if the variations had been the result of random 
errors. More than two-thirds of the variations in profit/loss 
could be explained in terms of project characteristics that 
established the market, and market conditions. There is no 
possible way of interpreting tendering theory in such a way as 
to explain why a group of skilled estimators should all at the 
same time, so systematically and with such a high degree of 
conformity under- or over-estimate the actual cost of a project 
by as much as is required for this result. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have attempted to find a place in economic 
theory for the voluminous work of the bidding strategists.  To 
do this we have argued for and adopted an approach by which a 
theory is derived by implication through examination of the 
assumptions upon which the general bidding strategy of Gates 
(196?) is adumbrated.  We have then subjected this implied 
theory of tendering to analysis insofar as it is possible to 
evaluate economic theories such as these which provide little 
opportunity for empirical testing.  The outcome of this 
evaluation has been that tendering theory, as implied by Gates, 
does not perform well in terms of accuracy of forecasts and 
informative content, and that there are inconsistencies in the 
logic, especially with regards to the assumed profit 
maximisation behaviour.  As a result we have been forced to 
conclude that bidding strategy, as a prescribed practice is ill-
founded and this may be one reason why there is little evidence 
of its adoption in practice or significant development in 
method.  As has been shown, bidding strategy falls uneasily 
between game theory, decision theory and the theory of auctions.  
This, together with the lack of theoretical development in the 
way of contrasts with conventional economic theory is, in 
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itself, cause for concern, and we have offered several reasons 
for the existence of this situation including the long running 
'controversy' over the method of calculating probabilities.  
Whilst not proposing an abandonment of the field, we do urge 
caution in the development of yet further refinements of methods 
for bidding strategy in the absence of a suitable theoretical 
framework.  In particular, the need to incorporate information 
concerning market conditions in future bidding models is 
highlighted. 
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